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INTRODUCTION
Currently, the international financial system lacks a structured
framework through which countries can restructure their external
debt.' In late 2001, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF" or
"Fund") addressed this urgent need by proposing the formation of a
formal international bankruptcy process.2 As the IMF continues to
refine the nuances of its proposal, the debate vigorously goes on as to
the proper composition of a viable international bankruptcy scheme
for IMF Members.3
Although the IMF proposal signaled a newfound urgency the
sustainability of developing countries' external debt has been a salient
issue on the international stage for some time.4 The issue gained
prominence following the onset of the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries ("OPEC") crisis, when the major private lending
institutions found themselves inundated with an extraordinary amount
1. See International Monetary Fund, Proposals for a Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM): A Factsheet [hereinafter IMF Factsheet]
(underscoring that the current international financial system lacks a strong legal
framework for sovereign debt restructuring), at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/sdrm.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003).
2. See Anne Krueger, International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New
Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address Before the National
Economists' Club Annual Members' Dinner (Nov. 26, 2001) (announcing that the
staff and management of the IMF would like to create a process encouraging
debtors and creditors to restructure unsustainable debt), at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/2001/l12601.htm (last visited Sept. 23,
2003).
3. See IMF Factsheet, supra note 1 (recognizing the lively debate surrounding
the IMF proposal).
4. See JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT OBLIGATIONS ix
(David M. Sassoon & Daniel D. Bradlow eds., 1987) (stating that the foreign debt
crisis has been high on the international agenda for some time and will demand
attention and careful analysis). The text further indicates that the crisis is unlikely to
be resolved in the foreseeable future; in fact, it will likely deepen. Id.
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of capital from the oil receipts of OPEC countries.5 Without enough
outlets for this sudden supply of financial resources, the private
lenders began offloading them on the developing countries in the
form of syndicated bank loans,6 which later became known as "petro-
dollar recycling."7 The sovereigns borrowed enthusiastically because
these loans enabled them to avoid the austerity measures typically
imposed on all official sector lending.'
Unfortunately, the zeal with which the creditors lent 9 -and for that
matter, with which the debtors borrowed'°-soon made it impossible
5. See DOMINICK SALVATORE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIcs 455 (Leah Jewell
ed., 1998) (recognizing the huge dollar deposits from petroleum-exporting countries
arising from the manifold increases in the price of petroleum).
6. See Elliott Ass'n. v. Banco De La Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 367 (2d Cir. 1999)
(defining syndicated bank debt as debt syndicated by a lead bank, which maintains
books and records for all holders).
7. See Jerome 1. Levinson, The International Financial System: A Flawed
Architecture, 23 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 1, 2-3 (1999) (explaining that petro-
dollar recycling occurred when the Persian Gulf producers were unable to spend
their oil revenues as fast as they were making them). Facing the dilemma of what to
do with them, the producers ultimately decided to deposit the surpluses in the major
multinational banks, who then, in turn, lent the money to other states in the form of
loans. Id.
8. See ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 316 (1987) (noting that the lesser developed countries ("LDCs")
fortunate enough to be classified as creditworthy had at last found a way around the
conditionality of the multilateral aid agencies); see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 4
(noting that the Newly Industrialized Countries ("NICs") no longer had to rely upon
the Bretton Woods institutions for loans, freeing them from IMF conditionality).
Unfortunately, some of the IMF's austerity measures have been partially blamed for
exacerbating the very economic turmoil that prompted the borrower to turn to the
IMF in the first place. See Hearing on the State of the Argentine Econ. Crisis and
the Role of the Int'l Monetary Fund Before the House Subcomm. on Int'l Monetary
Policy and Trade Comm. on Fin. Services, 2002 WL 25099845 (2002) (testimony
of Mark Weisbrot, Center for Economic and Policy Research) [hereinafter Hearing
on Argentine Econ.] (opining that the IMF contributed to the Argentine financial
crisis through lending conditions that economists in the United States would never
have recommended for their own economy during a recession).
9. See Lee C. Buchheit, A Lawyer's Perspective on the New International
Financial Architecture, 14 J. INT'L BANKING L. 225, 225 (1999) (explaining that the
sudden influx of petrodollar deposits made re-lending those funds the financial
imperative of the banks).
10. See id. at 226 (noting that the debt crisis had not curbed the appetite of
emerging market borrowers for external financing, it only curbed the method and
place in which that appetite would be satisfied).
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for many countries to continue servicing their debt while maintaining
even the most basic government services." When debt burdens
became truly unsustainable, and as a consequence, the debtor risked
defaulting, the debtor and a creditor cartel commonly referred to as
the "London Club"'' 2 entered into restructuring negotiations. 3
Following a series of financial crises and bailouts, 4 the United States
unveiled the Brady Debt Relief Initiative, which effectively reduced
11. See Lawrence H. Summers, Former Treasury Secretary (July 12, 2000)
(unpublished statement) (on file with the Department of the Treasury) (stating that
for every dollar Honduras spends on health care, it sends four dollars to its creditors
paying off old debts).
12. See Paul Williams & Jennifer Harris, State Succession to Debts and Assets:
The Modern Law and Policy, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 355, 381 n.137 (2001)
(explaining that the London Club is an informal organization of creditor banks
organized when the creditor is unable to meet its obligations).
13. See J.D. Berchild, Jr. & J.J. Norton, The Evolving United States Experience
with Alternative Dispute Resolution Respecting Financial Institution Disputes, in
NON-JUDICIAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 174, 183 (2000) (defining restructuring as an alternative way to
resolve disputes arising from a financial instrument, where negotiations between the
lender and borrower lead to both sides giving up something and gaining something).
The authors refer to it as non-bankruptcy "reorganization." Id.
14. See Argentina and the IMF Before the House Comm. on Fin. Structure,
Subcomm. on Int'l Monetary Policy and Trade, 2002 WL 25099844 (2002)
(testimony of Allan H. Meltzer, Carnegie Mellon University) (recounting how the
IMF made a five billion dollar advance to Argentina to prevent a banking and
currency run); William Easterly, The Failure of Development, FIN. TIMES, July 4,
2001, at 13 (noting that sometimes aid lenders gave loans to enable old loans to be
repaid). Bailouts are one of the main things the IMF hopes to avoid by
implementing the SDRM. Infra note 53. Oftentimes, the loans have prompted the
criticism that their primary function is to subsidize the poor decisions of investors
who were already sufficiently compensated for their increased risk of investing in
an emerging market by receiving higher interest rates. See Steven L. Schwarcz,
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 956, 964 (2000) (noting that these loans are effectively
subsidizing the defaulting states, as well as the defaulting states' creditors); see also
Barry Eichengreen, Bailing in the Private Sector: Burden Sharing in International
Crisis Management, 23-SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 57, 57 (1999) (noting that
in Mexico, South Korea, and Russia, official funds were used to repurchase and
retire short-term debt that private investors were unwilling to hold, thereby
shielding them from the consequences of their irresponsible lending decisions).
Eichengreen further argues that this provides incentives to the private investor to
engage in even less prudent lending, setting the stage for still larger crises and
consequent bailouts. Id.
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developing countries' debt burden. 5 The success of the Brady Plan
notwithstanding, external debt sustainability has remained a pressing
concern, 16 and because of a metamorphosis in the way capital is
presently acquired, restructuring has become markedly more
complicated. "
The peaceful resolution of the Cold War redirected the world's
attention to issues of globalization and economic liberalization.' 8 This
liberalization of the international capital markets gave the developing
countries a renewed ability to raise fresh capital by issuing
government bonds on the major bond markets in New York and
London. 19 Similar to the syndicated bank loans of the 1970's and
15. See Elliott Ass'n. v. Banco De La Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 366 (2d Cir. 1999)
(describing the Brady Plan as the U.S. Treasury urging of commercial lenders to
forgive some of the debt owed by less developed countries, restructure what
remained, and continue to grant those countries additional loans); see also Philip J.
Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its Implications for
Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2720 (1996) (describing the
Brady Plan as a new initiative designed to encourage banks to voluntarily reduce
the debt burdens of developing countries). See generally Diego Aramburfi, Brady
Plans for Commercial Bank Debt Relief, in GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE
LATIN AMERICAN DEBT PROBLEM 159 (Robert Grosse, ed., 1995) (recounting how
the U.S. Secretary of Treasury Nicholas Brady offered the U.S. government and
official sector support in obtaining debt service relief from commercial bank
creditors for those countries that successfully pursued comprehensive structural
adjustment programs supported by the IMF and the World Bank). Aramburi further
explains that the central feature of the Brady Plan was the menu of options, such as
debt conversion bonds, front-loaded interest reduction bonds, and new money
bonds. Id. at 160.
16. See Power, supra note 15, at 2701 (noting that the virtual disappearance of
syndicated bank loans has not eradicated the challenges facing debtors, as Latin
America's ratio of aggregate external debt earnings remains close to that prevailing
at the onset of the debt crises).
17. See id. at 2702-03 (positing that the transformation of the creditor class from
a relatively small number of private lending institutions to a large group of
bondholders will likely render the complexity of any future sovereign debt
restructuring far more significant than was previously the case).
18. See Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey Hart, Introduction to RESPONDING TO
GLOBALIZATION 1, 9 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey Hart eds., 2000) (identifying the
acceptance of free market principles as one of the most significant structural
changes in the post-Cold War economy).
19. See WILLIAM R. CLINE, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS.,
INTERNATIONAL DEBT REEXAMINED 449-50 (1995) (explaining that most of the
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1980's, the developing countries found this form of borrowing more
attractive than that available from the IMF, which typically involved
conditionality.20
By switching to bonds, a country's creditors become less
identifiable than the private lending institutions that make up the
London Club cartel.2' The London Club consists of a small group of
lenders with common interests, making loan restructuring with them
inherently more manageable.22 Bondholders, on the other hand, are
naturally a more diverse, amorphous 23 group with eclectic interests.2 4
Still, if a debtor wishes to salvage its creditworthiness and secure
fresh lending, it must reach an equitable arrangement with its
large troubled debtors of the 1980's have now reentered the international capital
markets by floating government bonds).
20. See GILPIN, supra note 8, at 316 (detailing how absence of loan
conditionality made private sources an attractive alternative to the IMF).
21. See Power, supra note 15, at 2702-03 (explaining that the increased number
of creditors makes the restructuring process more complicated); see also Anne
Krueger, Remarks at the Conference on "Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and
Hazards" at the Institute for International Economics (Apr. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
Hopes and Hazards] (noting that the "move from commercial bank loans to bond
issuance in the 1980s and 1990s has made creditor coordination much more
cumbersome"), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/040102.htm (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003).
22. See Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (noting the lack of diversity of the
syndicated lenders of the seventies and eighties compared with the body of modern
day bondholders).
23. Because bonds are freely transferable on the secondary market, it is difficult
for a sovereign to identify its creditor base at any one moment in time. See Power,
supra note 15, at 2763 (demonstrating that the rise of the secondary market has
made a sovereign's creditor base diverse and subject to change). Indeed, trading
volume on the bonds may actually increase during a time of illiquidity, making it
even more difficult to identify the holders. Id. at 2716. This type of market
judgment often tempts the opportunistic investor to buy the bonds issued of an
illiquid sovereign on the secondary market and then sue for full recovery. Id. If the
secondary market price of a country's debt is substantially discounted to reflect
default risk, at least some creditors may be able to obtain greater profits from a face
value collection action than from a pre-default resale of their debt at the prevailing
market price. Id. at 2764; see also discussion infra Part II.A (explaining how hold-
out creditors make the restructuring process more difficult).
24. See Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (stating that bondholders comprise a
much larger group than the private syndicated lenders).
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bondholders.25 One challenge, therefore, is to design a system that
overcomes the many obstacles encountered when the creditors, with
whom a debtor must negotiate, constitute such a diverse and
numerically unwieldy group.26
Creating this orderly restructuring process is vital to the health of
the international economy.27 If a country's external debt is not
successfully restructured in a timely manner, both legal and economic
consequences will make resolution of a liquidity crisis progressively
more complex.28 Thus, any proposal regarding the contemporary
external debt problem, in order to be successful, must address both
the legal 29 and the economic3 ° realities caused by the current
institutional vacuum.
While this Comment prescriptively considers the legal framework
that would best constitute an international bankruptcy scheme, the
25. See Rory Macmillan, Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-Out System, 16 NW.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 57, 59 (1995) (noting that, after its financial crisis, the Mexican
government was unable to return to the capital markets for six months). Macmillan
further states that the IMF would probably make any official sector loan contingent
upon some debt restructuring agreement between the debtor and its creditors. Id.
26. See discussion infra Part IL.A (outlining the implications of the institutional
vacuum).
27. See infra notes 56-57 (describing the economic impact of inaction in the
face of a debt crisis).
28. See, e.g., Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 146-47 (2d
Cir. 1991) (describing how creditors brought an action against Argentina for breach
of obligations arising from debt instruments); Lloyds Bank, PLC v. Republic of
Ecuador, 1998 WL 118170, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (highlighting the cause of action
to be various bondholders laying claim to debt agreements with Ecuador); Elliott
Ass'n. v. Banco De La Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 378 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that the
terms of the debt instrument called for application of New York law); Weston
Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, 442 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (N.Y. 1982)
(explaining that the terms of the note provide for the jurisdiction of New York
courts); see also infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (describing in detail the
ramifications of inaction). See generally RAvi C. TENNEKOON, THE LAW &
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 193 (1991) (explaining that the source of
a bondholder's legal rights is the bond contract, whose terms are enforceable in the
appropriate jurisdiction). There are usually clauses providing that New York law
will govern any disputes arising from the contract. Id.
29. See infra note 58 (citing a series of cases where private creditors seek
specific performance of their bond contracts).
30. See discussion infra Part L.A (highlighting the relevant economic
considerations).
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proposed solution will necessarily be guided by relevant economic
considerations." Part I discusses these legal and economic
considerations, as well as the two-pronged IMF proposal, consisting
of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism ("SDRM") and
Collective Action Clauses ("CACs").32 Part II argues that the SDRM
is unnecessarily complicated and, in the absence of American
acquiescence, overzealous.33 Part I also introduces an alternative
bankruptcy approach underpinned by Article VIII, section 2(b)
("section 2(b)") of the IMF's Articles of Agreement ("Agreement").34
After surveying the benefits of using section 2(b), Part II then
demonstrates that the provision suffers severely from narrow
interpretation by the courts.35 This narrow interpretation precludes the
present form of section 2(b) from successfully functioning as the crux
of an international bankruptcy scheme.36 Finally, Part III posits that
the IMF should adopt an alternative statutory approach.37 This
alternative involves amending section 2(b) of the IMF Agreement, as
well as adding new provisions.38 Doing so produces an effective legal
framework through which a state can restructure its debt while
simultaneously accounting for all of the IMF's objectives.39
I. BACKGROUND
Presently there is no international institution that provides the
procedures and protections analogous to those provided by Chapter
31. Id.
32. See discussion infra Part I.A-B (describing the relevant economic and legal
concerns and discussing the attributes of the SDRM).
33. See discussion infra Part II.A (noting that the United States does not support
the SDRM).
34. See discussion infra Part II.B. 1 (discussing the possible use of Article VIII,
section 2(b)).
35. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (surveying negative American precedent).
36. See id. (arguing that the precedents are a significant obstacle).
37. See discussion infra Part III (outlining in detail an alternative statutory
approach placing in the debtor the discretion to suspend debt payments in
anticipation of restructuring negotiations).
38. See id. (proposing a new statutory approach).
39. See id. (describing an alternative statutory approach).
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11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 40 The adverse implications
of this institutional vacuum are considerable. 41 Ameliorating these
negative consequences would be the obvious goal of any proposed
solution, and therefore, understanding them provides the necessary
background to the various proposals considered in this Comment.
A. ECONOMIC AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CURRENT
INSTITUTIONAL VACUUM
Debt officially becomes "unsustainable" when the debt-to-Gross
Domestic Product ("GDP") ratio rises incessantly.42 As this ratio
continues to rise, the sovereign may seek more revenue for debt
servicing by imposing higher taxes. 43 However, such a tax policy can
40. See Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 975-76 (explaining that Chapter 11 has
traditionally advanced two goals: rehabilitating of viable debtors and ensuring
equality of distribution of creditors); Steven L. Schwarcz, Global Decentralization
and the Subnational Debt Problem, 51 DUKE L.J. 1179, 1192 (2002) (explaining
how Chapter 11 principles allow for the freedom to agree on a reorganization plan).
Further, a bankrupt's choice to avail itself of these principles entitles it to protection
from creditor claims pending a negotiated agreement. Id.; see also MICHAEL J.
HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 105 (1995) (describing how filing for
Chapter 11 affords the debtor protection by placing a stay on judicial and non-
judicial proceedings). Chapter 11 reorganization is certainly the best analogy for
sovereign debt restructuring since sovereign states are not subject to liquidation as
is the case with other bankrupt entities, such as corporations. Cf Schwarcz, supra
note 14, at 977-78 (noting that the bankruptcy analogy applies only indirectly to
sovereign debt restructuring since States are not liquidated and their assets
redistributed).
41. See discussion infra Part L.A (considering the various implications of the
institutional vacuum).
42. See Anne Krueger, Remarks at the Banco de Mexico's Conference on
"Macroeconomic Stability, Financial Markets and Economic Development" (Nov.
12, 2002) [hereinafter Macroeconomic Stability] (explaining that a debt is
unsustainable when, under any realistic set of policies and circumstances that can be
envisaged, the debt-to-GDP ratio rises without limit), at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/2002/111202.htm (last visited Sept. 23,
2003).
43. See id. (explaining that in the face of unsustainable debt, a government may
try to increase taxes).
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stifle all prospects of economic growth,44 and without economic
growth there can be no long-term debt sustainability.45
Further, because the debt is often denominated and payable in hard
currency,46 the sovereign must earmark much of its hard reserves for
debt service.47 During these shortages of hard currency, the domestic
currency is exposed to speculative attacks48 that can compromise its
exchange rate, and consequently, increase the real value of any bonds
denominated in, for example, U.S. dollars.49 In other words, the
devaluation of the local currency's value can cause a country's debt
burden to double virtually overnight.5"
Restructuring becomes necessary when the sovereign can no longer
sustain its debt." However, until recently little incentive existed for a
44. See id. (positing that such policies are growth-reducing, thereby increasing
the degree to which the debt cannot be sustained). Thus, Krueger concludes that
rising interests rates cause an increase in the interest cost of the debt itself. Id.
45. Cf Hearing on Argentine Econ., supra note 8 (declaring both that debt
payment suspension would cause economic growth in Argentina with no
affirmative action and that typical IMF-recommended adjustments would likely
prolong the recession).
46. See HEATHER D. GIBSON, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: EXCHANGE RATES AND
FINANCIAL FLOWS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 221 (1996) (noting that the
dollar is the major currency of denomination in the Eurobond market).
47. See Francois Gianviti, Evolving Role and Challenges for the International
Monetary Fund, 35 INT'L LAW. 1371, 1374 (2001) (explaining that when a
government has payments due on bonds denominated in hard currency, it cannot
simply print local currency; thus, it must earn hard currency, during which time the
debt cannot be serviced).
48. See Peter C. Y. Chow, What We Have Learned from the Asian Financial
Crisis, in WEATHERING THE STORM: TAIWAN, ITS NEIGHBORS, AND THE ASIAN
FINANCIAL CRISIS 191, 201 (Peter C. Y. Chow & Bates Gill eds., 2000) (positing
that fluctuations in the exchange rate of the Japanese yen caused sudden and sizable
flows of funds into and out of the region that were too large and too speedy to stop).
49. See Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 147 (2d Cir.
1991) (explaining that Argentina depends on its reserves of United States dollars
and other internationally recognized currencies (i.e. hard currencies) to satisfy its
foreign debt).
50. See Cline, supra note 19, at 9 (describing a situation where the increased
value of the U.S. dollar caused a major rise in the nominal dollar stock of debt).
Exchange rate volatility means initially serviceable debt can suddenly become
unsustainable. Id.
51. See Power, supra note 15, at 2709 (noting that following the 1982 debt crisis
there was no framework or precedent on which to rely, and in its absence, the
[19:107
2003] ALTERNATIVE To IMF's SoVEREIGN DEBTRESTRUCTURING 117
sovereign to engage in restructuring negotiations because the IMF
often provided "bailout loans. 52 The IMF has made it clear, however,
that it no longer intends to provide these bailouts, 53 forcing the
illiquid sovereign to choose between defaulting on its outstanding
debt and ruining its creditworthiness, or participating in the
restructuring process.54 The current institutional vacuum, however,
lacks a formal framework to make that process orderly.55 As a
commercial lenders and debtors initiated informal negotiations to restructure the
debt).
52. See id. at 2710 (explaining that the IMF and its largest contributors resolved
the immediate crisis by providing a bridge loan, or a "bailout," to the debtor
allowing it to continue service of its debt); see also Humberto Campodonico, Peru's
Efforts to Achieve Reinsertion in the International Financial System, in
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE LATIN AMERICAN DEBT PROBLEM 63, 71 (Robert
'Grosse ed., 1995) (noting that the purpose of bridge loans is to straighten out
existing arrears); Eichengreen, supra note 14, at 57 (describing the common
criticism that bailouts functioi to subsidize the poor decisions of investors).
53. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond
Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59, 60 (2000) (stating that the IMF has made it clear
to private holders of sovereign bonds that the official sector will not bail them out
during any future sovereign debt workouts). But see Paul Blustein, IMF Readying
'Transitional' Loan to Head Off Argentine Default, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2003, at
A07, (reporting that the IMF is considering granting Argentina a "transitional" loan,
which is reportedly generating intense controversy because part of the IMF's
motive is to stave off a threatened default), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51831-2003Jan 13.html (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003). The regularity of IMF bailouts led to a "moral hazard,"
whereby the IMF inadvertently promoted irresponsible lending and borrowing
because of an expectation by the parties that the IMF will provide similar bailouts
in the future. See generally, Buchheit, supra note 9, at 228 (providing that a moral
hazard exists when massive public sector bailouts encourage and reward reckless
investment decisions by the creditors and unsound economic policies by the
debtors). Buchheit further maintains that a moral hazard exists when massive public
sector bailouts encourage and reward reckless investment decisions by the creditors
and unsound economic policies by the debtors. Id. See generally Schwarcz, supra
note 14, at 961-62 (positing that countries anticipating an IMF bailout might have
less reason to take a prudent economic course, and lenders that anticipate being
protected from default might have a greater tendency to take unwarranted financial
risk). But cf STEPHEN HAGGARD, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN
FINANCIAL CRISIS 6-7 (2000) (stating that moral hazards occur when liabilities have
an implicit guarantee).
54. Cf Buchheit, supra note 53, at 60 (noting that the IMF will no longer
perform bailout loans).
55. See Power, supra note 15, at 1209 (taking note of the absence of a formal
debt restructuring mechanism).
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consequence, there is a great probability that investor panic will lead
to a flurry of capital outflow,56 or worse, economic contagion.57
Economic factors, however, are not the only forces demonstrating
the urgent need for an orderly restructuring process. Rather, the chaos
following a sovereign default often causes bondholders-with whom
the sovereign should ideally be negotiating for a mutually beneficial
solution-to petition the New York courts for a judgment in their
56. Capital outflows occur when foreigners rush to exchange the local currency
in which they are invested for their originally invested U.S. dollars. See ROY E.
ALLEN, FINANCIAL CRISES AND RECESSION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 79 (1999)
(explaining how international holders of local currency "run" on that currency by
demanding dollars in exchange for the local currency). Hence, "outflow" refers to
U.S. dollars leaving the local economy. Id.; see also supra notes 47-50 and
accompanying text (describing how foreign debt is often denominated in hard
currency, and so when a sovereign is unable to service its debt, it must buttress
those reserves); In fact, it has been noted that a loss of dollars is perhaps the worst
possible event that may occur during liquidity crises, since it is usually a paucity of
hard reserves that causes the crises in the first place. Id. Nevertheless, sudden
increases in these outflows can devastate the local currency as well as the rest of the
domestic economy. Id.; see also, e.g., Chow, supra note 48, at 199 (postulating that
capital outflows standout as one of the catalytic elements causing the Asian
Financial Crisis); Nicholas D. Kristof & David Sanger, How the United States
Wooed Asia to Let Cash Flow In, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999, at AI (noting that
liberal capital flows greatly contributed to the financial crisis in Thailand, which
then spread throughout Asia, Russia, and finally Brazil).
57. Cf Buchheit, supra note 9, at 225-29 (opining that to visit losses or even
debt re-schedulings upon skittish bond investors flirts with contagion, the loss of
private capital flows for indefinite periods, economic contraction in the debtor
countries and disruptions to world trade, and financing relationships). Buchheit
further explains that when contagion occurs, there seems to be something other than
traditional market forces at work. Id. at 226. Often, investors will group together
countries from a certain region and assume that political or economic turmoil in one
naturally means turmoil in others. Id. Buchheit argues that bond investors are not
good at discriminating between emerging markets, and thus, tend to retreat-
causing contagion. Id. But cf Hearing on Argentine Econ., supra note 8 (implying
that investors' doubts concerning the possibly volatile Argentine peso were rational
when one considers the 1994 Mexican peso crisis and the 1997 Asian economic
crisis, as well as the 1998 Russian and the 1999 Brazilian currency devaluations).
See generally HAGGARD, supra note 53, at 6-7 (explaining that when crises start in
one country, there are a variety of channels through which they can be propagated
to other countries, including fear of competitive devaluation or financial leakages).
Haggard continues to argue that the financial meltdown in Thailand in 1997 "begat
Indonesia and Malaysia; Taiwan's devaluation begat market meltdown in Hong
Kong in late October; and that meltdown begat South Korea, which resonated back
through the Southeast Asian markets at the end of 1997." Id.
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favor. 8 This is made possible by choice-of-law clauses found in most
bond contracts issued on the New York bond market.5 9 These clauses
vest jurisdiction in the New York courts for nearly all matters arising
out of the bond contract.6" Again, this flurry of litigation results from
the institutional vacuum that could otherwise place a stay on all
creditor-claims initiated against the debtor." If too many of these
bondholders go to the courts, debt restructuring may no longer be
practicable.62
What is needed, then, is a structured and predictable method
through which a debtor can secure a restructuring.63 In order to be
successful, the process first must have the confidence of the investors
so that initiating restructuring negotiations does not perpetuate
contagion effects.64 Additionally, it must protect the debtor from
individual creditor claims so that the debtor might effectively assess
58. See, e.g., Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1991) (describing how creditors brought an action against Argentina for breach of
obligations arising from debt instruments); Lloyds Bank, PLC v. Republic of
Ecuador, 1998 WL 118170, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (highlighting the cause of action
as various bondholders laying claim to debt agreements with Ecuador). See
generally Elliott Ass'n. v. Banco De La Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 378 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that by acquiring a debt instrument where the intent to litigate for
enforcement is incidental or contingent, private bondholders shall be able to avail
themselves of the New York courts).
59. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 53, at 59 (noting that New York law
governed many of the government bonds issued on the international market).
60. See id. (examining the commonly invoked New York choice of law
provision in bond contracts).
61. See HERBERT, supra note 40, at 105 (explaining that placing a stay on all
creditor claims, as is commonly done in actual Chapter 11 reorganization, shields
the debtor from those claims during the period of negotiation).
62. See MONTEK S. AHLUWALIA, COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, REFORMING
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 48-49 (2000) (noting that when a country
faces a liquidity crisis and is not given some temporary respite from these private
actions, the debtor will have neither the time nor the resources to reach a voluntary
agreement). Ahluwalia underscores the benefit a bankrupt entity enjoys by the
imposition of a stay against all creditor claims in that the stay provides both the
time and the resources needed to reach an agreement beneficial to creditor and
debtor alike. Id.
63. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (explaining the negative
consequences resulting from the absence of a structured and predictable
restructuring mechanism).
64. See id. (describing the contagion phenomenon in detail).
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its financial situation and negotiate a mutually beneficial agreement
between it and its entire creditor base.65 Ideally, use of the process
would become a matter of course so that investors would neither
undermine the negotiations by bringing individual claims, nor would
they allow a fear of economic catastrophe to become a self-fulfilling
prophesy.66 This result, among others, is exactly what the IMF
purports its proposal will accomplish.67
B. THE IMF PROPOSAL EXPLAINED: COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES
("CACs") AND THE SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING
MECHANISM ("SDRM")
In recent years, the restructuring problem has sparked an official
response from both the IMF68 and the U.S. Treasury Department.69
The IMF advocates a two-pronged solution: first, a contractual
approach whereby all new bond issues would carry with them CACs;
and second, a statutory approach coined the SDRM, which would
establish a separate entity to facilitate the restructuring process.70
65. See supra notes 25, 58 and accompanying text (discussing the implications
of failing to protect the debtor during negotiations).
66. See discussion infra Part III.A (explaining that an international bankruptcy
framework can help in this regard by facilitating the negotiations and resolving the
liquidity crisis sooner than was previously possible); see also supra note 56
(illustrating the phenomenon of capital flows by noting specifically that the less
time the crisis remains unresolved, the less time there is available for investors to
liquidate their investments in the debtor-nation).
67. See Macroeconomic Stability, supra note 42 (arguing that the SDRM would
prevent capital outflow by providing a more orderly framework for restructuring,
and underscoring that a government would be afforded protection from individual
creditor claims).
68. See infra note 70 (quoting IMF policy towards the sovereign debt issue).
69. See infra note 77 (describing American policy regarding the sovereign debt
issue).
70. See International Monetary Fund, Public Information Notice: IMF Board
Discusses Possible Features of a New Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
(stating that "[t]he Fund is considering two complementary approaches to creating a
more orderly and predictable process for sovereign debt restructuring: (i) a
contrdctual approach, in which debt restructurings would be facilitated by enhanced
use of certain contractual provisions in sovereign debt contracts and (ii) the
establishment of a universal statutory framework which would create a legal
framework for collective decision making by debtors and a supermajority of
creditors"), at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pn/2002/pnO2106.htm (last
[19:107
2003] ALTERNATIVE TO IMF's SO VEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 121
CACs already appear in government bonds issued on the London
market, but not in those issued in New York.7" As a consequence, any
country wishing to restructure its debt issued on the New York bond
market must first obtain the unanimous approval of all holders of that
particular bond instrument.7 Assuming, arguendo, the good faith of
all actors in this system, one can easily imagine the logistical and
transactional difficulty in gaining the unanimous approval of so many
private bondholders.73 In practice, however, the debtor must also face
the challenge of "holdout creditors," where, as a natural consequence
of the unanimity requirement, recalcitrant creditors can coerce
benefits greater than that to which they are equitably entitled.74
However, the inclusion of CACs significantly lessens the problems
of holdout creditors75 and bondholder coordination.76 CACs are
visited Sept. 23, 2003). The contractual side of the proposal is considered the more
moderate of the two. Id.; see also Ralph C. Bryant, Standards and Prudential
Oversight for an Integrating World Financial System, in ESSAYS ON THE WORLD
ECONOMY AND ITS FINANCIAL SYSTEM 219, 262 (Brigitte Granville ed., 2000)
(suggesting that the more modest steps suggested for more orderly ways of debt
restructuring include majority-voting, collective-representation clauses in new bond
contracts, and clauses requiring a certain percentage of bondholders to agree before
legal action could be taken).
71. See John B. Taylor, Speech at the Conference "Sovereign Debt
Restructuring: A United States Perspective" at the Institute for International
Economics (Apr. 2, 2002) [hereinafter A United States Perspective] (noting that
CACs currently appear in sovereign bonds issued under British law, but not in those
issued under New York Law), at http://www.iie.com/papers/taylor0402.htm (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003).
72. See Buchheit, supra note 9, at 228 (noting that bonds issued under American
law require the unanimous consent of all bondholders before any changes to the
bond's terms can be made).
73. See id. (explaining the unanimity requirement for bond restructures).
74. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 961 (explaining that "in a sovereign
debt restructuring context, any lender whose consent is needed for an overall
settlement could hold out for a disproportionate share on the threat of preventing the
settlement").
75. See Bryant, supra note 70, at 262 (stating that the goal of CACs is to prevent
a few creditors from instigating legal actions or any other means of obstructing
restructurings when such restructurings are in the interests of the debtor and the
great majority of creditors); see also Eichengreen, supra note 14, at 63
(underscoring the incentive to purchase bonds from less patient investors and to
threaten lawsuits designed to attach the debtor's assets). Eichengreen argues that the
debtor, wishing to avoid expensive and embarrassing litigation, may feel compelled
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simply clauses in the bond contract binding every holder of that bond
issue to any decision made by a supermajority of all the holders.77
Thus, if restructuring becomes necessary, so long as the debtor
reaches an agreement with, for example, seventy percent of its
holders, the agreement will bind all holders regardless of whether
they voted in favor or against the terms.7 8 Consequently, dissenting
holders would be barred from bringing private actions for
enforcement of their bond contracts in New York courts.79 While this
is the first of a two-pronged IMF strategy, the United States has not
to buy them out at full price so that they may be able to reach a settlement with
more amenable bondholders. Id.
76. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (addressing the difficulty in
coordinating a restructuring negotiation with bondholders).
77. See R. Glenn Hubbard, Remarks at the Conference on the IMF's Sovereign
Debt Proposal at the American Enterprise Institute (Oct. 7, 2002) (explaining that
incorporating CACs would allow a supermajority of bondholders to agree to
amendments to the payment terms of the bond, which would then become binding
on other bondholders), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/EnhancingSovergeignDebtRestructuringAElOct72
002.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2003). It is fairly settled that inclusion of CACs will
not raise borrowing costs. Id.; see also Eichengreen, supra note 14, at 63-64
(arguing that the relative ease of negotiating with CACs should help avoid a long
deadlock and render the majority of investors better off). Accordingly, bond holders
will not negatively react to the inclusion of these clauses. Id.
78. See Buchheit, supra note 9, at 228 (explaining that CACs permit
amendments to bond contracts when there is the affirmative vote of a supermajority
of the particular instrument's holders).
79. See Anne Krueger, Remarks at the Bretton Woods Committee Annual
Meeting (June 6, 2002) [hereinafter Bretton Woods Committee] (positing that
supermajority voting would afford the debtor legal protection from creditors during
negotiations), at http://www.imf.org.external/np/speeches/2002/060602.htm (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003). Krueger further indicates that bonds not containing CACs
(issued on the New York market) allow private bondholders to seek enforcement of
the bond contract in U.S. courts. Id.; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text
(confirming the right of a bondholder to bring an individual action in New York
courts to enforce the terms of the contract). Furthermore, the case law demonstrates
that if the bond is sold on the secondary market, the purchaser, so long as he
remains the rightful owner of the bond, henceforth holds all rights appertaining to a
bond contract, including the right to sue in the New York courts for enforcement.
Id.; cf TENNEKOON, supra note 28, at 193 (observing that there is a direct legal
nexus between each successive bondholder and the original issuer, and that that
nexus transmits to each successive holder the rights and obligations contained in the
bond instrument, as well as any restrictions and exemptions).
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indicated a willingness to sanction anything beyond the inclusion of
CACs in bond contracts.8"
The IMF, however, does not believe that CACs alone can provide a
comprehensive solution because of several identified limitations."
Instead, it advocates a legislative approach in addition to the
contractual approach of CACs.12 As proposed, this SDRM would,
similar to CACs, allow a supermajority of creditors to agree upon a
resolution with the debtor and bind the remaining creditors in
dissent.83 According to the Fund, the SDRM would consist of an
independent forum,84  created through an amendment to the
80. See A United States Perspective, supra note 71 (describing the need for a
proposal, and affirmatively supporting the use of CACs, but remaining silent as to
the prudence of the IMF's SDRM); see also Hubbard, supra note 77 (advocating
the use of CACs, but expressing American reservations about the SDRM). Hubbard
posits that it would be a slow, difficult process, and underscores that its formation
would require eighty-five percent of the membership vote. Id.; see also IMF, World
Bank Overhaul Before the J. Econ. Comm., 2002 WL 25099068 (2002) [hereinafter
World Bank Overhaul] (testimony of John B. Taylor, United States Treasury for
International Affairs) (calling for a decentralized approach to the sovereign debt
problem and advocating the use of CACs).
81. See Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (noting that CACs only bind the
holders of the particular bond issue in question). For example, their application is
limited to the particular bond issue in which the clause actually appears. Id.
Additionally, even if each CAC is drafted with the exact same phrasing, Krueger
opines that they will inevitably be subject to differing interpretations depending on
the jurisdiction in which it becomes relevant. Id. Lastly, and perhaps most
importantly, Krueger notes that while CACs do offer an attractive long-term
solution for future bond issues, there is no indication of how they can solve the
problem of those bond issues currently outstanding that do not contain CACs. Id.
82. See Buchheit, supra note 9, at 228 (explaining that CACs permit
amendments to bond contracts when there is the affirmative vote of a supermajority
of the particular instrument's holders).
83. See Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (explaining that the SDRM would
place the essential decision-making power in the debtor and a supermajority of
creditors).
84. See Bretton Woods Committee, supra note 79 (discussing the SDRM's
independence from the IMF).
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Agreement, in which the restructuring would take place.85 Any
agreement certified by the forum would bind all Members.86
In addition to establishing what is effectively a Chapter 11
bankruptcy forum, the IMF articulated three attributes of the proposed
system. First, upon request, the debtor could secure a stay on all
creditor claims.87 Second, the creditors would have the power to
extend the length of the stay in case extra time is needed to break an
impasse.88 Third, creditors would be encouraged to subordinate their
outstanding claims to any new loans in order to encourage fresh
lending.89
Through this proposal, the IMF hopes to create a formal,
predictable, and reliable method through which sovereign debtors can
seek a restructuring.90 If successful, this method should help to avert
future debt crises. 91 Because this proposal is still in its infancy,
however, it remains unclear whether it is the best legal alternative or
politically feasible.
II. ANALYSIS
This section argues that the SDRM cannot successfully provide a
lasting solution to the external debt problem. 92 Specifically, the
85. See Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (stating that the IMF could establish
the SDRM by amending its Articles of Agreement, which would require acceptance
by 3/5's of the IMF membership, carrying eighty-five percent of the total voting
power).
86. See IMF, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM-FURTHER
CONSIDERATIONS 28 (August 14, 2002) [hereinafter FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS]
(explaining that the forum's certifications would have a direct binding effect in all
member countries), at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/pdr/sdrn/2002/081402.pdf
(last visited Sept. 23, 2003). This text indicates therefore that each Member's courts
would have to comply with the certification and give it legal effect. Id.
87. See Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (noting an important attribute of the
SDRM to be the sovereign's ability to secure a stay on creditor claims).
88. See id. (suggesting that the stay should be extendable).
89. See id. (noting the importance of securing fresh lending).
90. See id. (discussing the goal of the SDRM).
91. See generally id. (implying that the proposed system will limit the
occurrence of future debt crises).
92. See Hubbard, supra note 77 (describing the United States' opposition to the
SDRM).
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SDRM suffers not from a lack of sound theory, but rather from
flawed implementing procedure.93 This section also considers the oft-
proposed use of Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Agreement as a
potential alternative for achieving orderly restructuring.94 Finally, this
section concludes by highlighting several important reasons why this
attractive alternative, in its present form, also fails to produce a viable
solution.95
A. AMERICAN INFLEXIBILITY MAKES THE SDRM UNWORKABLE
The United States consistently has made clear its policy toward the
formation of a Sovereign Chapter 1 1 framework. 96 Moreover, there is
no indication that a policy shift is forthcoming.97 Instead, the United
States favors the exclusive use of CACs in bonds issued on the New
York market and is opposed to the formation of a separate forum
vested with the jurisdiction to facilitate the restructuring process and
bind all Members of its certifications.98
The lack of American acquiescence will prove fatal to the SDRM
because its implementation requires an amendment to the IMF
Agreement.99 Article XXVIII of the Agreement outlines the procedure
for an amendment's approval. 00 Specifically, three-fifths of the
93. See discussion infra Part II.A (arguing that the SDRM is substantively
sound but suffers from procedural inadequacies).
94. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (suggesting that section 2(b) could
theoretically function as a bankruptcy mechanism).
95. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (demonstrating that courts' interpretation of
section 2(b) precludes it from effectively functioning as a bankruptcy process).
96. See Hubbard, supra note 77 (describing Washington's support for the
principles underlying CACs, but also expressing American reservations about
including the SDRM in any permanent international bankruptcy system).
97. See supra note 80 (listing statements in opposition to the SDRM). Not one
of the United States' statements reviewed for this Comment implied a willingness
to support the SDRM. Id.
98. See id. (advocating the use of CACs, but expressing the United States'
reservations about the SDRM and suggesting that it would be a slow, difficult
process).
99. See Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (stating that the SDRM would be
achieved through an amendment to the Articles of Agreement).
100. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22,
1944, art. XXVIII(a) [hereinafter Agreement] ("When three-fifths of the members,
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membership, wielding eighty-five percent of the vote, must favor the
amendment. ' 0' Having the largest quota'02 of all members of the Fund,
the United States wields just over seventeen percent of the vote,
giving it a defacto veto.103 Thus, the biggest weakness of the SDRM
lies not in its substantive attributes, but rather in the procedural
protocol necessary to bring the concept into existence. 0 4 Curiously,
the IMF has failed to address this most vital and conspicuous obstacle
to its policy.105
The United States has not thoroughly outlined the reasons for its
opposition; therefore, explaining its position necessarily involves
conjecture.10 6 Perhaps the United States is uncomfortable with the
having eighty-five percent of the total voting power, have accepted the proposed
amendment, the Fund shall certify the fact by a formal communication addressed to
all members.").
101. Id.
102. See Agreement, supra note 100, art. III, § 1 (defining a Member's quota).
"The subscription fee of each member shall be equal to its quota and shall be paid
in full to the Fund at the appropriate depository." Id. A Member's quota is
expressed in special drawing rights ("SDRs"). See id. ("Each member shall be
assigned a quota expressed in special drawing rights."). A Member's amount of
SDRs is extremely important because its voting power is directly dependent on its
financial contribution to the Fund, as expressed in special drawing rights. See id.,
art. XII, § 5(a) ("Each member shall have two hundred fifty votes plus one
additional vote for each part of its quota equivalent to one hundred thousand special
drawing rights.").
103. See International Monetary Fund, IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power,
and IMF Governors [hereinafter Quotas and Voting Power] (indicating that the
United States has 37,149.3 million SDRs, comprising more than seventeen percent
of the total institutional voting power), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/memdir/members.htm (last visited Sept. 23,
2003).
104. See supra notes 99-103 (demonstrating that the SDRM will likely fail
because procedural protocol allows the United States to block its implementation).
105. See, e.g., Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (failing to discuss political
realities necessary to bring the concept into existence); Bretton Woods Committee,
supra note 79 (lacking any mention of political considerations).
106. See, e.g., A United States Perspective, supra note 71 (demonstrating how
the United States has not explicitly explained its opposition to the SDRM);
Hubbard, supra note 77 (expressing the lack of an articulated United States
rationale for objecting to the SDRM).
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binding nature of the forum's certifications. 0 7 As a related matter, it
may fear the erosion of Members' jurisdiction by the forum. 08
Whatever the actual point of contention might be, speculation may
prove moot because the international community must nevertheless
formulate an orderly and predictable restructuring process that
accounts for U.S. objections. 0 9 One common suggestion has been to
use section 2(b) of the Agreement."0 However, the present form of
section 2(b) precludes it from being the best possible alternative. "
107. This proposition may be inferred from the fervent American support of
CACs and it adversity towards the SDRM. See supra note 80 and accompanying
text (citing various sources that express the United States' support for CACs and its
disfavor for the SDRM). This U.S. distinction is especially curious because
"majority control" is the central concept underlying both proposals. Id.; see also
Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (explaining that both the SDRM and CACs
would allow a majority of creditors to make an arrangement binding upon the
minority in dissent). Thus, if trying to explain why the United States favors one
proposal but not the other, one might search for latent distinctions between the two..
In this case, CACs would still leave a role for the U.S. courts, where the SDRM's
certifications are binding, and therefore, shielded from the United States court
review. Id.; see also FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 86 (stating that the
forum's certifications would become binding on each member, and cannot,
therefore, be challenged in the domestic courts of any member).
108. Cf A United States Perspective, supra note 71 (noting that the IMF
approach is more centralized than the United States' approach); World Bank
Overhaul supra note 80 (calling for a decentralized contract-based approach). From
these statements admonishing against centralized power in the forum, one might
conclude that the United States is adverse to an accumulation of jurisdiction and
power in the SDRM. Id.
109. See discussion, supra Part L.A (underscoring the importance of designing an
international bankruptcy forum).
110. See, e.g., Power, supra note 15, at 223-24 (describing how Article VIII,
section 2(b) could be used as a means of making bond contracts unenforceable in
foreign courts); Gianviti, supra note 47, at 1374-76 (explaining that many scholars
have long advocated the use of Article VIII, section 2(b) as a bankruptcy
mechanism); see also Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional De Costa Rica, S.A., 570
F. Supp. 870, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (analyzing the legality of a Costa Rican
Regulation imposed pursuant to Article VIII, section 2(b), and noting that the
purpose of said Regulation was to remedy its problems in servicing its external
debt); Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, 442 N.E.2d 1195, 1200
(N.Y. 1982) (explaining that Turkey had previously imposed a similar. section 2(b)
Regulation to facilitate its restructuring).
111. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (examining the obstacles of using section
2(b) as a restructing-faciliator).
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B. SECTION 2(B) AS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THEORETICAL
APPEAL AND THE PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS
Proposals to use section 2(b) antedate the SDRM as a potential
means for streamlining the restructuring process.112 Theoretically
speaking, merit exists in employing section 2(b) in this capacity." 3
Realistically, however, narrow interpretations typically imposed by
the U.S. courts compromise the viability of the section 2(b)
approach." 4 This narrow construction has lead many observers to
abandon section 2(b) as a viable possibility."5 Yet, total abandonment
may be premature." 6 By making specific additions and amendments
to the Agreement, the IMF may not only preserve section 2(b)'s
positive attributes, but may also buttress its efficacy by ridding the
provision of its shortcomings."7 At this point, it is necessary to
consider both how section 2(b) might theoretically provide an
attractive alternative to the SDRM, as well as how section 2(b)'s
practical shortcomings have thus far precluded its use in this capacity.
112. See supra, note 110 (citing extensive sources that suggest the use of section
2(b) to streamline the restructuring process).
113. See Gianviti, supra note 47, at 1375-77 (demonstrating that Members can
creatively use Article VIII, section 2(b) to achieve an effect tantamount to a
bankruptcy stay, whereby all creditor claims are blocked because foreign courts are
forced to give effect to the debtor's moratorium on debt payments); see also
discussion infra Part 1l.B.1 (describing in more depth how section 2(b), in theory,
could function as an international bankruptcy system).
114. See Werner Ebke, Article VIII, Section 2(b), International Monetary
Cooperation, and the Courts, 23 INT'L LAW. 677, 682 (1989) (noting that courts,
through their interpretations of section 2(b), have disregarded the objectives of the
IMF); Gianviti, supra note 47, at 1375 (noting that courts in the United States have
interpreted section 2(b) rather restrictively); cf F. A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF
MONEY 379-80 (5th ed. 1992) (demonstrating how this narrow interpretation
pervades English law as well). Mann notes an English Court of Appeals' narrow
interpretation of important phrases within section 2(b). Id.
115. See Gianviti, supra note 47, at 1375 (noting that while there are still some
who support the use of Article VIII, section 2(b) as a means to restructure sovereign
debt, the recent emphasis has been on possible alternatives).
116. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing the restructuring
potential of section 2(b)).
117. See discussion infra Part III.A (arguing that section 2(b) can indeed be very
useful if, and when, the IMF makes some necessary amendments).
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1. Article VIII, section 2(b)functioning as a stay on individual
creditor claims.
Theoretically, it is possible for section 2(b) to function as a
bankruptcy stay on creditor claims."' In exceptionally opaque
language, section 2(b) of the Agreement provides, in relevant part:
[e]xchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and
which are contrary to the exchange control regulation of that member
maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be
unenforceable in the territories of any member. "19
Although vague, one might infer from this language that the
drafters sought to preserve within individual Members the qualified
ability to impose exchange control regulations enforceable in any
Member's courts. 20 This observation, however, fails to explain what
it means when a country imposes "exchange control regulations"
("section 2(b) Regulations" or "Regulations").
The Agreement's drafters likely intended section 2(b) Regulations
to give the sovereign the ability to buttress its currency's exchange
rate by restricting the outflow of hard currency reserves.' 2' In
118. See Gianviti, supra note 47, at 1375-77 (demonstrating how a Member can
use Article VIII, section 2(b) to achieve an effect tantamount to a bankruptcy stay).
119. Agreement, supra note 100, art. VIII, § 2(b).
120. See JOSEPH GOLD, IMF, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS UNDER THE
LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 30 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 21,
1977) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS] (explaining that original
plans were achieved through Article VIII, section 2(b) to codify the obligation that
Members cooperate and make each other's capital controls effective in their courts).
121. See id. at 30 (discussing that the Article VIII, section 2(b) allowed Members
to impose capital restrictions). Although important at the time, Gold asserts that a
sovereign's ability to control capital flows has become an even greater concern
today than it was during the drafting of the Agreement. Id.; see also Chow, supra
note 48, at 199 (postulating that capital outflows were a main contributor to the
1997 East Asian Financial Crisis). The imperativeness of having this ability derives
from a direct correlation that often exists between the amounts of a nation's hard
reserves on the one hand, and the exchange rate of its currency on the other. See
GIORGIO RADAELLI, EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION AND CONTROL 92 (1995)
(explaining that the short term impact of capital controls can help authorities battle
currency turbulence and avoid speculative attacks); cf PAUL KRUGMAN,
INTRODUCTION TO CURRENCY CRISES 2 (Paul Krugman ed., 2000) (recognizing the
widespread belief that a depletion of foreign exchange reserves forces a country's
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contrast, the drafters probably did not envision section 2(b) as
providing a method for Members to stay creditors' claims.122
Nevertheless, placing section 2(b) Regulations on bond payments
could have an effect tantamount to a bankruptcy stay.123
central bank to give up its defense on the value of the local currency). One can
explain this phenomenon by simple supply and demand principles. Cf DEREK H.
ALDCROFT & MICHAEL J. OLIVER, EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 41 (1998) (illustrating how loss of confidence in the local currency can
lead to a rush to exchange it for a more stable currency, and implying that the
increased demand on the foreign currency, and hence, the decreased supply of that
currency, can lead to a devaluation of the local currency vis-A-vis the foreign
currency). Therefore, Aldcroft and Oliver argue that by restricting the flow of those
hard reserves, the regulating country can maintain its supply of reserves, which will
then have a corresponding stabilization-effect on the exchange rate between the two
currencies. Id.
122. See Beth A. Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public
International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 323, 340 (2000) (explaining that
the original purpose of section 2(b) was to protect the ability of governments to
maintain approved restrictions). See generally infra note 128 (surveying the various
purposes served by Article VIII, section 2(b) and not mentioning debt restructuring
as one of them). The proposition that restructuring was not an original purpose of
section 2(b) is buttressed by the fact that, according to the Vienna Convention, a
treaty should be interpreted in light of its stated objectives. See Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between
International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, art. 31(1), 25 I.L.M. 543, 562 (stating
that one shall interpret a treaty in light of its object and purpose). Doing so with the
Articles of Agreement might lead one to conclude that the primary purpose of
section 2(b) was to provide a means to respond to capital outflows. See generally
Agreement, supra note 100, art. VIII, §2(b) (providing for the implementation of
exchange control regulations). For example, article I(iii) cites as one goal of the
Fund to avoid competitive devaluations among the Members. Agreement, supra
note 100, art. I(iii). Using section 2(b) to respond to capital outflows can be a means
toward that end. See supra note 121 (explaining how devaluations can result if a
country is unable to implement the section 2(b) Regulations). Article 1(v) describes
another relevant goal of the IMF as providing an opportunity for members to correct
maladjustments in their balance of payments. Agreement, supra note 100, art. I(v).
It is most certain that section 2(b) Regulations on capital outflows can correct an
imbalance of payments. See MANN, supra note 114, at 382 (noting the German
interpretation that one purpose of section 2(b) was to prevent negative effects upon
Members' balance of payments). Finally, nowhere in the Agreement is it a stated
goal of the IMF to help facilitate debt restructuring. Id. See generally infra note 128
and accompanying text (surveying the various purposes served by Article VIII,
section 2(b) and not mentioning debt restructuring as one of them).
123. See Gianviti, supra note 47, at 1375-77 (explaining that sovereigns can use
section 2(b) Regulations on capital outflow as a means to enforce a debt payment
moratorium).
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For example, a country facing a liquidity crisis could protect any
remaining liquidity by imposing a section 2(b) Regulation, thereby
prohibiting the export of hard currency abroad. 2 4 Because the
Regulation would necessarily suspend all bond payments, the terms
of the contract would often place the sovereign in official default and
trigger a cause of action for the creditors. 25 But because all Members
are obliged to give extraterritorial effect to a properly-imposed
section 2(b) Regulation, the creditor's cause of action will fail to
mature, giving the parties time to engage in restructuring
negotiations.2 6 More specifically, section 2(b)'s text provides that if
the Regulation is imposed consistent with the Agreement,127 other
Members are then obliged to respect the integrity of those
Regulations and may not enforce in their courts any contracts
contravening their spirit. 28
124. See id. (explaining that states become illiquid when they can no longer pay
foreign debtors because their hard reserves need replenishing and suggesting that
section 2(b) might be used to suspend enforcement of the bond contracts, thereby
providing the sovereign with a reprieve). This section 2(b) regulatory power was
originally vested in Members so they could prevent currency crises. See supra note
121 and accompanying text (highlighting that the original purpose of section 2(b)
Regulations was to regulate capital flows, not facilitate the restructuring process).
Now, however, it is suggested that those same regulations on the outflow of hard
currency can help both to stabilize a country's liquidity while simultaneously
precluding any individual actions to enforce the terms of the contract. Id.
125. Cf TENNEKOON, supra note 28, at 193 (observing that the bond is a source
of rights and obligations between the parties).
126. See Gianviti, supra note 47, at 1375 (noting that section 2(b) could
theoretically function as a stay on foreign creditor's actions and that such result
would be achieved via a government-imposed moratorium on payments by resident
debtors to their foreign creditors). See generally supra notes 121-124 and
accompanying text (explaining that section 2(b) Regulations, if properly imposed,
have extraterritorial effect, thereby precluding private creditors from exercising
actions in domestic courts).
127. See infra notes 165-166 (noting that whether the sovereign actually imposed
a given Regulation "consistent with the Agreement" has been a major source of
controversy and has served as a means through which the U.S. courts have managed
to limit their obligations arising under Article VIII, section 2(b)).
128. See Unenforceability of Exchange Contracts: Fund's Interpretation of
Article VIII, § 2(b) 446-4, in SELECTED DECISIONS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 452-53 (1998) [hereinafter
Unenforceability of Exchange Contracts]:
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Using section 2(b) in this manner produces an effect tantamount to
a stay on all creditor claims, thereby obviating the need for the
SDRM's formal stay process.' 29 Hypothetically, then, section 2(b) of
the Agreement obligates the United States not to grant specific
performance of a bond contract if doing so contravenes the properly-
imposed Regulations of the debtor. 130 In other words, U.S. courts
must give extraterritorial legal effect to those section 2(b)
Regulations.' 3' The essence of the inquiry, then, becomes not whether
the merits of the creditor's claim rightly entitle her to performance,
but whether the comity principles 3 2 of section 2(b) permit the court to
entertain her claim in the first place. 33
The Board of Executive Directors of the [IMF] has interpreted ... Article VIII,
Section 2(b) ... as follows:
Parties entering into exchange contracts involving the currency of any member
of the Fund and contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member
which are maintained or imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement will
not receive the assistance of the judicial or administrative authorities of other
members in obtaining the performance of the contracts or by awarding
damages for their nonperformance.
An obvious result of the foregoing undertaking is that if a party to an exchange
contract.., seeks to enforce such a contract, the tribunal of the member
country before which the proceedings are brought will not.., refuse
recognition of the exchange control regulations of the other members which
are maintained or imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement.
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp?decision=446-4 (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003).
129. See generally Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (describing a Member's
ability to secure a stay on creditor claims as an important attribute of the SDRM).
Using section 2(b) in this manner ensures a similar ability. See Gianviti, supra note
47, at 1375 (noting that section 2(b) could be used as a stay).
130. See Unenforceability of Exchange Contracts, supra note 128 (asserting that
IMF members may not assist in contract enforcement where the contract was
negotiated in contravention with exchange control regulations).
131. See id. (outlining IMF members' obligation to adhere to section 2(b)
Regulations).
132. See Power, supra note 15, at 2738 (defining comity as "the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation") (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 164 (1895)).
133. See generally Unenforceability of Exchange Contracts, supra note 128
(clarifying that section 2(b) precludes courts from enforcing a contract that
contravenes another Member's 2(b) Regulation).
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Although 2(b)'s theoretical application is appealing, its realistic
application is severely inhibited by practical limitations.
34
Oftentimes, when charged with the task of determining the scope of
one's obligation under section 2(b), U.S. courts will construe it so
narrowly that they eviscerate any responsibility that may otherwise
have arisen from the provision. 35 As a result of the courts' disfavor of
section 2(b) defenses, 36 it has fallen into disuse by sovereign
defendants and, consequently, is in need of significant overhaul.'37
First, however, it is useful to consider how U.S. courts have construed
section 2(b) so narrowly. 38
2. The narrow treatment of section 2(b) by the U.S. courts
A number of phrases embedded within the language of section 2(b)
have provided fertile ground upon which to limit the provision's
application. Two phrases-"exchange contracts" and "consistent with
this agreement"-pose the greatest obstacles to section 2(b)'s use as a
restructuring-facilitator 39
134. See Ebke, supra note 114, at 691 (noting that U.S. courts have construed
section 2(b) almost to the point where the provision vanishes).
135. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (analyzing precedent on courts' narrow
construction of obligations under section 2(b)).
136. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 822 (1987)
(suggesting that section 2(b) might be used as a defense); Ebke, supra note 114, at
701 (explaining that the courts of most IMF members are of the opinion that Article
VIII, section 2(b) provides a defense); Werner Ebke, Article VIII, Section 2(b) of
the IMF Articles of Agreement and International Capital Transfers: Perspectives
from the German Supreme Court, 28 INT'L LAW. 761, 766 (1994) (noting that
German courts have been more receptive of the Article VIII, section 2(b) "defense"
when compared with other IMF members).
137. See, e.g., Lloyds Bank, PLC v. Republic of Ecuador, 1998 WL 118170
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (demonstrating failure of Sovereign debtor to raise the defense);
Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 146-47 (2d Cir. 1991)
(exemplifying the scenario of a debtor deciding not to use the defense); Elliott
Ass'n. v. Banco De La Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 367 (2d Cir. 1999) (lacking a section
2(b) defense).
138. See Ebke, supra note 114, at 691 (noting that the U.S. courts have construed
section 2(b) almost to the point where the provision vanishes).
139. Agreement, supra note 100, art. VIII, § 2(b).
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a. "Exchange Contracts"
The inquiry of what precisely constitutes an "exchange contract"'
' 40
for section 2(b) purposes probably has received more scholarly
attention than any other phrase appearing in the provision. 14' Because
only those contracts that are deemed "exchange contracts" fall within
the ambit of section 2(b), 142 a court's interpretation of this term will
necessarily place a concomitant limitation on section 2(b)'s scope as a
whole. American and English interpretation 143 holds that "exchange
contracts" are all those contracts that have "as their immediate
objective the exchange of one currency for another."'" As a
consequence, regardless of whether a contract somehow affects a
Member's own hard reserves, a Member should expect its section
2(b) Regulation to supercede only those contracts governing the
direct exchange of one currency for another. 145 The courts make this
limitation in spite of permissive language appearing elsewhere in the
140. See id. (codifying that "[e]xchange contracts which involve the currency of
any member. ..").
141. See, e.g., 8 JOSEPH GOLD, IMF, THE CUBAN INSURANCE CASES AND THE
ARTICLES OF THE FUND 25-27 (1966) [hereinafter CUBAN INSURANCE] (discussing
the controversy over the exact meaning of "exchange contracts"); MANN, supra
note 114, at 378-86 (providing an in-depth survey of the ambiguity surrounding the
meaning of "exchange contracts"); Ebke, supra note 114, at 686-91 (surveying the
various interpretations assigned to the phrase "exchange contracts").
142. See Agreement, supra note 100, art. VIII, § 2(b) ( "[e]xchange contracts
which involve the currency of any member...").
143. See MANN, supra note 114, at 379 (describing the English adoption of an
interpretation of section 2(b) where the only contracts that would qualify are those
that exchange one currency of one country for that of another); Gianviti, supra note
47, at 1375 (describing the American courts' interpretation of "exchange contract"
to be those contracts intended for the exchange of currencies and opining that such
narrow interpretation is caused by the provision's ambiguity); Ebke, supra note 114
(describing one of Judge Meyer's dissenting opinions, and noting that U.S. courts
have not adopted his broad interpretation of the phrase "exchange contract").
144. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OFFOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 822 (1987).
145. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1 (explaining that section 2(b) Regulations
can theoretically give the debtor the ability to impose debt payment moratoriums
that other Members must5 grant legal effect to). Thus, the Regulation allows
debtors to effectively to block the enforcement of a bond contract in foreign courts.
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Agreement that places sole discretion in Members to regulate all
those transactions considered "capital movements."
1 46
Dallal v. Islamic Republic of Iran, argued before the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, is demonstrative of this narrow construction
of section 2(b). "47 In Dallal, the complainant purported to be the
lawful holder of two checks drawn by International Bank of Iran, both
payable to his New York bank account. 148 After the New York bank
dishonored both checks, 49 the holder filed a complaint for the value
of the checks plus interest. 50 In its defense, Iran argued that an
official circular issued by its central bank prohibited the transfer
abroad of foreign exchange.' 5' The tribunal easily concluded that
because the true character of the transaction was simply to exchange
rials (Iranian currency) for dollars, an "exchange contract" existed. 5 2
While most would agree that the checks in Dallal constitute
"exchange contracts,"'53 compelling reasons exist not to limit the
146. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b (explaining that Members have within
their discretion the ability to regulate "capital movements" but they need IMF
approval to regulate "current transactions"); see also Agreement, supra note 100,
art. VIII, § 2(a) ("[N]o member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose
restrictions on the making of payments ... for current international transactions.").
"Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international
capital movements .... " Id. art. VI, § 3.
147. See Dallal v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 3 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 10, 15-17 (Iran-
U.S.Cl. Trib. 1983) (reasoning that an exchange of one currency for another is, in
fact, an exchange contract).
148. See id. at 10-11 (recounting that Mr. Dallal became the lawful holder of two
checks from the International Bank of Iran, which were both payable to his account
at Chemical Bank New York).
149. See id. (noting that Mr. Dallal contended that the New York bank refused to
honor both checks).
150. See id. (explaining that Mr. Dallal sought the face amount plus interest).
151. See id. at 11 (explaining that Iran referred the Tribunal to a Bank Markazi
circular containing certain currency regulations that rendered payment on the
checks in direct breach of same).
152. See id. at 15-17 (reasoning that if the true character of the transaction was
simply to exchange rials for dollars and transfer the dollar amount to the United
States-which is what occurred in this case-there is no doubt that the transaction
was an exchange contract within the meaning of the IMF Agreement).
153. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text (illustrating that most legal
sources concur that a contract providing for the exchange of two different
currencies should be considered an "exchange contract" for section 2(b) purposes).
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phrase's meaning to this one extreme. Article VI, section 3 clearly
establishes that Members have sole discretion to impose section 2(b)
Regulations on all "capital movement" transactions.'54 Consequently,
other Members are generally obliged to give effect to all section 2(b)
Regulations that restrict "capital movements." '155
By limiting the scope of "exchange contracts" to the facts in
Dallal, courts are implying that Members do not have at their sole
discretion the ability to regulate-and therefore "capital movements"
do not include-any transaction that does not directly exchange
currencies. 5 6 If the drafters intended to limit section 2(b)'s
application to this narrow factual scenario, they might have more
appropriately placed in Members the sole discretion to regulate
"capital exchanges" in lieu of the seemingly broader phrase "capital
movements."' 57 Certainly there are "capital movements" that do not
involve direct currency exchanges.'58
154. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b (explaining that Members have within
their discretion the ability to regulate "capital movements," but they need IMF
approval to regulate "current transactions"); see also Agreement, supra note 100,
arts. VIII, § 2(a) & VI, § 3 (outlining members' freedom to choose to impose
section 2(b) Regulations); INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 120,
at 14 (noting that Members are free to control capital transfers).
155. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (explaining that Members' courts are
obligated to recognize any properly imposed section 2(b) Regulation).
156. See generally Agreement, supra note 100, art. VI, § 3 (illustrating that
Members have within their sole discretion the ability to impose section 2(b)
Regulations on "capital movements"). Because of this unqualified ability, the only
reasonable inference from the courts strict interpretation of "exchange contracts" is
that only direct currency exchanges will classify as "capital movements" in U.S.
courts, otherwise the section 2(b) Regulation would be permissible. Cf Dallal, 3
Iran-U.S.C.T.R. at 15-17 (stating that a simple exchange of rials for dollars
demonstrates the meaning of "exchange contracts").
157. See Agreement, supra note 100, art. VI, § 3 (discussing Members' ability to
use their discretion to exercise controls necessary to regulate international "capital
movements"). Article VI, section 3 has a fundamental relationship with Article
VIII, section 2(b), which requires that all Members' Regulations be imposed
consistently with the Agreement. Id.; see also discussion infra Part II.B.2.b
(explaining that a Member may regulate "capital movements" consistently with the
Agreement in the absence of IMF approval but that no Member may regulate
"current payments" consistently with the Agreement in the absence of IMF
approval). Consistency with the Agreement notwithstanding, it is posited that
instead of allowing for the regulation of "capital movements," if the Framers
intended to limit the application of section 2(b) only to those contracts directly
exchanging two currencies, such result could have been easily achieved by allowing
136 [19:107
2003] ALTERNATIVE TO IMF's SOVEREIGN DEBTRESTRUCTURING 137
For example, a "capital movement" probably takes place whenever
a sovereign issues a government bond denominated and payable in
American dollars.'59 Even though two currencies are not directly
exchanged for one another, it appears that capital has nevertheless
"moved" from the country in which the investor resides towards the
country floating the bond. 60 This form of "capital movement" makes
it unreasonable to suppose that the drafters intended "exchange
contracts" to comprise only the restricted group of transactions
illustrated by Dallal.'61 Certainly, it would be inconsistent with
Article VI, section 3 to define "exchange contracts" in a way that
divests Members of the discretion to impose 2(b) Regulations on
"capital movements."'162
If section 2(b) is ever going to form the crux of an international
bankruptcy scheme, it is vital that "exchange contracts" be afforded
broader interpretation so that bonds issued and payable in one
for regulation of "capital exchanges." See generally discussion infra Part II.B.2.b
(explaining that Members have the authority to regulate "capital movements"); see
also Vienna Convention, supra note 122, art. 31(1) ("A treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty...").
158. Cf REUVEN GLICK, ET AL., Introduction to FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING
MARKETS 28 (Reeuven Glick et al. eds., 2001) (implying "Capital Movements"
simply refers to the flow of capital resources in and out of an entity).
159. See RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 625 (1995) (noting that international bond transfers directly affect a
state's currency reserves).
160. Cf Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 147 (2d Cir.
1991) (demonstrating the lending nature of bond instruments).
161. See GOLD, supra note 141, at 26-27 (arguing that exchange contracts exist
even when two separate currencies are not directly exchanged for one another).
According to Gold, the important inquiry is not the character of the transaction
itself, but rather its ultimate effect. Id. Gold continues to note that classic exchange
contracts (those exchanging one currency for another) have a practical effect on a
Member's hard currency reserves. Id. Because non-classic exchange contracts
similarly affect a Member's hard reserves, Gold posits they should appropriately be
placed within the ambit of Article VIII, section 2(b). Id.
162. See Agreement, supra note 100, art. VI, § 3 (stipulating that IMF Members
"may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital
movements...").
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currency fall within its ambit.163  Unfortunately, the current
interpretation cripples section 2(b)'s debt restructuring potential.' 6
b. Imposed "Consistently with this Agreement"
Another significant source of controversy concerns whether the
sovereign imposed the section 2(b) Regulation consistent with its
assumed obligations under the Agreement in toto.165 The underlying
inquiry is whether the Regulation required prior IMF approval; or
alternatively, whether its imposition was in the sole discretion of the
debtor.1 66 According to the Agreement, if the Regulation restricts
"current international transactions," then IMF approval is required. 6 7
If, however, it regulates international "capital movements," there is
no need to seek prior IMF approval. 68
Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional De Costa Rica, S.A. 169
illustrates how the nebulous distinction between "current
transactions" and "capital movements" allowed an American court to
163. See FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 159, at 625 (noting that the current
state of the law precludes bonds from qualifying as "exchange contracts").
164. See Dallal v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 3 lran-U.S.C.T.R. 10, at 15-17 (Iran-
U.S.C1. Trib. 1983) (reasoning that an exchange of one currency for another is, in
fact, an exchange contract).
165. See Agreement, supra note 100, art. VIII, § 2(b) (providing for
extraterritorial effect of a Member's regulation only if imposed "consistently with
the Agreement").
166. See id. art. VIII, § 2(a) & art. VI, § 3 (illustrating that regulations of "capital
movements" are in the sole discretion of the imposing Member, while regulations of
"current transactions" require IMF approval in order to be consistent with the
Agreement).
167. See id. art. VIII, § 2(a):
Subject to the provisions of Article VII, Section 3(b) and Article XIV, Section
2, no member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on
the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions.
168. See id. art. VI, § 3:
Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international
capital movements, but no member may exercise these controls in a manner
which will restrict payments for current transactions or which will unduly
delay transfers of funds in settlement of commitments, except as provided in
Article VII, Section 3(b) and in Article XIV, Section 2.
169. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional De Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp.
870, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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frustrate its obligations under section 2(b). In this case, Libra, an
American Bank, made a $40 million loan to Banco Nacional of Costa
Rica.170  After paying the first installment, Banco Nacional
defaulted,' placing the blame on a Ministry of Finance decree.7 2
The decree prohibited Banco Nacional from making principal or
interest payments on foreign debt without the prior approval of the
Central Bank.'73 The Court additionally found that Costa Rican
officials imposed the decree to address its difficulty in servicing its
foreign debt.' 74 The Central Bank later denied Banco Nacional's
request for hard currency to pay the second installment on Libra's
loan.'75 When Libra filed suit, Banco Nacional argued, among other
things, that the decree was a section 2(b) Regulation of international
"capital movements," and therefore, the American court was
obligated to recognize its legal effect.'76
Using an illustrative list found in Article XXX of the Agreement,'
the Court reasoned that the Regulation was not consistent 78 with the
170. See id. at 874 (recounting that Libra Bank acted as an agent for sixteen
banks in the making of a forty million dollar loan to Banco Nacional, a wholly
owned Costa Rican bank).
171. See id. (explaining that after the first installment, Banco Nacional made no
further payments).
172. See id. at 875 (noting that Banco Nacional alleged that a Central Bank
resolution prevented it from honoring the loan agreement).
173. See id. at 874 (reciting Banco Nacional's allegation that Costa Rica's
banking laws required the Central Bank's approval of all foreign exchange
transactions).
174. See Libra Bank Ltd., 570 F. Supp. at 870 (explaining that Costa Rica
adopted the banking resolution in an effort to remedy its problems in servicing its
external debts). This is a valuable "real world" example of how IMF Members
might use section 2(b) Regulations during liquidity crises. Id.
175. See id. (explaining that the Central Bank denied Banco Nacional's requests
for foreign currency in order to repay plaintiff's loans).
176. See id. at 897 (turning to the last defense by the defendant that the loan
agreement is not consistent with Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Agreement
because it required the circumvention of a properly-imposed Regulation).
177. See Agreement, supra note 100, art. XXX:
(d) Payments for current transactions means payments which are not for the
purpose of transferring capital, and includes, without limitation:
all payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business,
including services, and normal short-term banking and credit facilities;
139
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IMF Agreement because it restricted "current transactions" rather
than "capital movements."' 79 Therefore, the Court reasoned, Costa
Rica was obligated to secure prior approval from the IMF before
implementing the section 2(b) Regulation. 80 Because Costa. Rica
failed to do so, the Court felt no obligation to recognize the
Regulation's effect.' Additionally, the Court treated section 2(b) as
an affirmative defense, placing on the defendant the burden of
proving whether it imposed the section 2(b) Regulation consistently
with the Agreement. 182
The Court's underlying assumption was that a country can receive
IMF approval only if it first petitions the Fund and imposes the
Regulation after receiving affirmative, express approval.'83 This,
however, is not the only possible interpretation of the Agreement. It
payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other investments;
payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for depreciation of
direct investments; and moderate remittances for family living expenses.
178. Incidentally, demonstrating that a sovereign's regulation is designed to
pursue the stated objectives of the Fund is not sufficient to prove that the regulation
was "consistent" with the Agreement. See Libra Bank Ltd., 570 F. Supp. at 901
(calling "bland" the assertion that merely fulfilling the purposes of the Agreement
satisfies the consistency requirement).
179. See id. (holding that transactions of this type are appropriately classified as
"current transactions"); see also Agreement, supra note 100, art. XXX (categorizing
all payments due in connection with short-term banking and credit facilities as
"current transactions"). Although this transaction was a "current transaction," and
therefore requiring IMF approval, it does not necessarily follow that Costa Rica's
failure to obtain express, prior approval is tantamount to a failure to secure
satisfactory approval. See Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, 442
N.E.2d 1195, 1203-04 (N.Y. 1982) (arguing that the IMF's silence regarding
Turkey's capital Regulations could easily be regarded as implied acquiescence or
approval) (Meyer, J., dissenting).
180. See Libra Bank Ltd., 570 F. Supp. at 901 (holding that Costa Rica's failure
to secure IMF approval of the regulation rendered it inconsistent with the
Agreement).
181. See id. (holding that because the Costa Rican government failed to secure
IMF approval, section 2(b) did not apply, and consequently, U.S. courts were not
obligated to recognize the Regulation).
182. See id. (holding that a "defendant who relies on Article VIII, Section 2(b)
necessarily asserts that exchange controls are maintained or imposed consistently
with the Articles, and he should have the burden of proving that this fact").
183.- See id. (reasoning that Costa Rica imposed the Regulation inconsistent with
the Agreement because it did so without IMF approval).
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seems unreasonable that the drafters, having originally included
section 2(b) in the Agreement as a response mechanism for monetary
crises, 18 4 expected the sovereign first to traverse a potentially lethargic
approval process before imposing emergency measures." 5 Early
response is vital because the severity of economic crises tends to
increase temporally. 8 6 Therefore, identifying section 2(b)'s purpose
as a response mechanism for monetary crises reasonably leads to the
inference that the absence of IMF objection should suffice as legal
IMF approval.I87
184. See GOLD, supra note 120, at 30 (explaining that the purpose of Article VIII,
section 2(b) is to place in Members the ability to respond to currency crises).
185. See Agreement supra note 100, art. VIII, § 2(a) (codifying that Members
cannot impose regulations on current international transactions without IMF
approval). By requiring IMF approval, this provision at first seems to limit the
scope of section 2(b). Id. But the Agreement does not expressly require prior
approval, nor does it define "approval." Id. Because the drafters included section
2(b) in the Agreement as a crisis response mechanism, it seems unreasonable to
interpret Article VIII, section 2(a) to require the Member to engage the IMF in a
prior, formal approval procedure. Cf GOLD, supra note 120, at 30 (explaining that
Article VIII, section 2(b) allowed members to impose capital restrictions); infra
note 186 and accompanying text (describing in detail the consequences of
government inaction in the face of a debt crisis).
186. See discussion supra Part L.A (describing the economic consequences of
inaction by the government in the face of a debt servicing crisis). Furthermore, by
requiring the sovereign to announce its need to impose these regulations so that they
may secure a restructuring, the IMF would be inviting economic contagion. See
supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (describing the contagion phenomenon
and illustrating how investor panic can act as a precursor to regional economic
turmoil). If restructuring negotiations immediately occur with little or no interim
period, there will be less uncertainty, and consequently, less risk of investor panic.
Id.; see also Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (recognizing the potential danger
during that period between the debtor's request for a stay and the point at which
negotiations would begin, and stating that use of section 2(b) Regulations may form
a necessary defense). Therefore, because a major goal of organized sovereign debt
restructuring is to avoid exacerbating economic turmoil by providing a reliable and
predictable process, the court's promulgation in Libra that a sovereign must first
secure IMF approval before beginning the restructuring process cannot possibly be
consistent with any discussion about an international bankruptcy scheme. Id.
187. See Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, 442 N.E.2d 1195,
1203-04 (N.Y. 1982) (arguing that the IMF's silence regarding Turkey's capital
Regulations could easily be regarded as implied acquiescence or approval) (Meyer,
J., dissenting). Meyer continues to note that the Fund had affirmatively announced
its disapproval of a similar Czech Regulation. Id. Finally, Meyer concludes that the
plaintiff had failed to present any evidence suggesting that the Regulation -was
inconsistent with the Agreement. Id. Because he found the paucity of plaintiffs
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In the wake of Libra, however, it seems reasonably certain that
U.S. courts will not classify as "capital movements" any section 2(b)
Regulation intended to restrict payments on foreign debts.'88 Further,
Libra held that Members can secure IMF approval for a proposed
Regulation only through explicit, affirmative IMF acceptance." 9
Accordingly, in its present form, a sovereign can use section 2(b)
both to regulate debt payments and stay claims only if it first manages
to secure IMF approval. 190 However, such approval will not always be
forthcoming, and if it is, it may nevertheless prove too late to quell
the economic turmoil caused by inaction.'9'
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the SDRM could effectively function as an international
bankruptcy mechanism, the United States will likely block its
implementation. 92 It therefore becomes necessary to consider other
ways to achieve similar objectives, while simultaneously gaining U.S.
support. 193 In doing so, the basic attributes of section 2(b) seem very
promising. 94 Like the SDRM, however, section 2(b) fails to provide
evidence dispositive, it impliedly follows that Meyer would not place the burden of
proof on the defendant to establish that it imposed the regulation consistent with the
Agreement. Id.
188. See Libra, 570 F. Supp. at 901 (holding that regulation of debt payments is
not within Members' sole discretion to regulate).
189. See id. (holding that Members may not regulate "current transactions" in the
absence of express IMF approval).
190. See id. (holding that Costa Rica's failure to secure IMF approval of the 2(b)
Regulation rendered said Regulation inconsistent with the Agreement).
191. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text(detailing the consequences
for failing to properly address a liquidity crisis).
192. See A United States Perspective, supra note 71 (failing to give the United
States' support for the IMF's SDRM); see also Hubbard, supra note 77 (suggesting
the SDRM would involve a slow, difficult process); Quotas and Voting Power,
supra note 103 (demonstrating that the United States wields more than seventeen
percent voting power).
193. See A United States Perspective, supra note 71 (recounting the United
States' policy towards sovereign debt restructuring and support for CACs).
194. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1 (describing the potential use of article VIII,
section 2(b) as the crux of an alternative international bankruptcy scheme).
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an effective alternative, albeit for different reasons. 95 Nevertheless,
section 2(b)'s obstacles may be overcome through simple textual
amendments and additions to the Agreement as a whole. 96 The
following suggested amendments offer an alternative approach that
both addresses American reservations and functions similar to the
SDRM and CACs. 197
A. STATUTORY AMENDMENTS PROVIDE THE SOLUTION
As a preliminary matter, the Members must amend the Agreement
to vest in debtors the sole discretion to suspend temporarily their debt
payments. 98 As discussed above, Members already have sole
discretion to regulate "capital movements" but are required to obtain
IMF approval for regulations of "current transactions."' 99
Unfortunately, Libra demonstrates that loan payments are currently
classified as "current transactions. '"200 In response to this negative
precedent, the following language should be added to Article VIII,
section 2(a):
Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to divest any Member of
the discretionary authority to impose temporary restrictions on debt
195. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (recounting the interpretive limitations of
article VIII, section 2(b) and demonstrating the crippling effect of these decisions).
196. See World Bank Overhaul, supra note 80 (calling for a decentralized
approach to the sovereign debt problem).
197. See discussion infra Part III.A (suggesting ideal language to incorporate into
amendments to the Agreement).
198. See Agreement, supra note 100, art. VI, § 3 (illustrating that Members have
sole discretion to impose section 2(b) Regulations on "capital movements").
However, U.S. courts have too narrowly defined "capital movements" to include
debt payment suspensions. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional De Costa Rica,
S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that debt payment
suspensions are appropriately classified as "current transactions," not "capital
movements").
199. See Agreement, supra note 100, art. VI, § 3 (stating "[m]embers may
exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements,
but no member may exercise these controls in a manner... restrict[ing] payments
for current transactions .... ").
200. See Libra Bank Ltd., 570 F. Supp. at 901 (holding that loan payments are
"current transactions"); Agreement, supra note 100, art. XXX (codifying that bond
payments are properly classified as "current transactions").
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payments, 20 1 as provided in Article VIII, section 2(b), if imposed in good
faith and only for the purpose of external debt restructuring. 202
This addition could allow a debtor to impose unilaterally a section
2(b) Regulation at the very moment it is no longer capable of
servicing its debt. 23 The section 2(b) Regulation would have an effect
tantamount to a bankruptcy stay, thereby precluding the sovereign's
creditors from enforcing a bond contract in any Member's court. 204
The section 2(b) Regulation also will provide a period during which
negotiations can take place,25 and because no prior IMF approval is
201. Without this clause, courts could preclude Members from temporarily
suspending debt payments in anticipation of forthcoming restructuring negotiations.
See Libra Bank Ltd., 570 F. Supp. at 901 (holding that debt payment suspensions
are appropriately classified as "current transactions").
202. This clause is included to prevent Members from abusing the authority to
discontinue unilaterally its debt payments. See generally Agreement, supra note
100, art. VI, § 3 (illustrating that Members have within their sole discretion the
ability to impose section 2(b) Regulations on "capital movements").
203. See Agreement, supra note 100, art. VI, § 3 (codifying that Members have
sole discretion to regulate "capital movements," thereby making them enforceable
in foreign courts). However, in its present form, Members could not use these
section 2(b) Regulations on debt payments because they are not considered "capital
movements." See Libra Bank Ltd., 570 F. Supp. at 901 (holding that debt payments
were "current transactions"). This proposed amendment dispenses with the "capital
movement" versus "current transaction" distinction for restructuring purposes,
thereby placing back in Members broad discretion to impose unilaterally a section
2(b) Regulation.
204. See Gianviti, supra note 47, at 1375-77 (demonstrating that Members can
creatively employ Article VIII, section 2(b) to achieve an effect tantamount to a
bankruptcy stay, whereby all creditor claims are blocked because foreign courts are
forced to give effect to the debtor's moratorium on debt payments); cf
Unenforceability of Exchange Contracts, supra note 128, at 452-53 (demonstrating
that a properly imposed section 2(b) Regulation has the force of law in all
Members' courts).
205. See Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (emphasizing the importance of
providing a stay on creditor claims during the negotiation process and how section
2(b) Regulations could be used to prevent capital flight). The IMIF sought to achieve
through the SDRM's stay a period during which a sovereign could negotiate
without menacing private actions and without capital flight. Id.; see also Gianviti,
supra note 47, at 1375-77 (illustrating how section 2(b) Regulations can be used to
have the same effect as a bankruptcy stay).
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needed, the unilateral Regulation will naturally expedite the initiation
of a potentially protracted negotiation process.0 6
Yet, there is a countervailing concern that the IMF must also
address. A safeguard must be in place to ensure that the sovereign can
impose the section 2(b) Regulation only in good faith and only to the
extent necessary for the purpose of reaching an agreement with its
creditors.20 7 Therefore, although discretion should be placed in the
debtor, it must be qualified.20 8 The best solution would allow the
sovereign to impose unilaterally a preliminary section 2(b) Regulation
and give the IMF ultimate authority to declare, based only on
objective evidence, that the Regulation is an abuse of the Member's
discretion.20 9 Members' courts should be under no obligation to give
the Regulation extraterritorial effect if the IMF expresses its
disapproval. 0 If, on the other hand, the IMF acquiesces, the
206. Cf Libra Bank Ltd., 570 F. Supp. at 901 (holding that a sovereign debtor
would need IMF approval before it could impose a Regulation on debt payments).
Because the proposed amendment will allow the debtor to impose the Regulation
unilaterally without having to await formal approval, negotiations can commence
sooner than would otherwise be the case. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b
(underscoring the economic and legal importance of swift response to a debt crisis).
207. See generally Agreement, supra note 100, art. VIII § 2(b) (illustrating how a
legitimately implemented section 2(b) Regulation precludes enforcement in the
courts of any member of a transaction whose terms require circumvention of the
Regulation). Abuse is highly foreseeable given the broad discretion that this
Comment's recommendation places in Members to impose unilaterally a section
2(b) Regulation; accordingly, it is something for which the system must account.
Otherwise, Members could arbitrarily suspend debt payments and leave creditors
with no way to seek redress.
208. See generally Gianviti, supra note 47, at 1375-77 (illustrating how Members
would theoretically have the power to unilaterally stay all claims). Naturally, then,
it would be best to place a check on that discretion to curtail the occurrence of
gratuitous Regulations. Id.
209. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b (arguing that the Libra Court made an
unwarranted assumption that IMF approval can manifest itself only through. an
affirmative approval and alternatively positing that the absence of IMF objection
should suffice); Gianviti, supra note 47, at 1375-77 (describing a potential
application of section 2(b) that places sole discretion in Members to stay creditor
claims); see also supra note 207-208 and accompanying text (describing the
potential abuse when placing broad discretion in the Member); supra note 206 and
accompanying text (noting the importance of responding quickly and decisively in
the infant stages of a debt crisis).
210. See Agreement, supra note 100, art. VIII, § 2(a) (mandating the need for
IMF approval for restrictions on current transactions).
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Regulation's imposition would be considered consistent with the
Agreement, and all Members' courts would then be obliged to
dismiss without prejudice any individual claim for a period of, for
example, six months."' Additionally, IMF silence should sufficiently
establish IMF acquiescence."1
Bondholders should have the ability to vote for an extension of the
section 2(b) Regulation if the parties cannot reach a mutually
acceptable arrangement by the end of the six-month period.1 3 If they
choose not to extend its application, they are once again free to bring
private, individual claims. 214 The creditors, although temporarily
foregoing the right to enforce individually the terms of their contract
with the sovereign, will be re-vested with that right if negotiations
should reach an impasse. 215 This can all be accomplished by adding
the following proposed language at the end of Article VIII, section
2(b):
In the event a Member contemplates such regulations for the purpose of
restructuring external debt, it shall be sufficient that the IMF does not
affirmatively disapprove of the regulation. 2 16 The IMF shall affirmatively
211. See Unenforceability of Contracts, supra note 128 (ruling that Members are
prohibited from enforcing a contract whose performance contravenes the purpose of
the 2(b) Regulation).
212. See Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, 442 N.E.2d 1195,
1203-04 (N.Y. 1982) (Meyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the IMF's silence
regarding Turkey's capital Regulations could easily be regarded as implied
acquiescence or approval).
213. See Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (noting the ability of creditors to
extend the length of the bankruptcy stay to be a central feature of the SDRM).
214. See TENNEKOON, supra note 28, at 193 (explaining that the bond contract's
terms serve as a source of rights upon which the creditor can sue the debtor for
specific performance). However, a section 2(b) Regulation bars the enforcement of
those rights. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (explaining that a legitimately
imposed section 2(b) Regulation has extraterritorial application, barring the
enforcement of any legal instrument whose enforcement requires circumvention of
the Regulation).
215. Cf TENNEKOON, supra note 28, at 193 (noting that the terms of the bond
contract serve as a source of rights upon which a legal nexus is created between the
creditor can sue the debtor for specific performance). Thus, an equitable system
would certainly re-vest creditors with these rights. Id.
216. Compare Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional De Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F.
Supp. 870, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (reasoning that Costa Rica imposed the relevant
regulation inconsistent with the Agreement and without IMF approval) with Weston
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express its disapproval only when it is objectively evident that the
exchange regulation was not imposed solely for the good faith purpose of
addressing a liquidity crisis.2 17 In the absence of IMF disapproval, any
regulation under this section shall have an extraterritorial effect for a
period of six months, any extension of which is entirely within the
discretion of the Member's creditors.
218
During the period of the Regulation's application, the debtor can
begin restructuring negotiations with a group of creditor
representatives, all of whom shall be elected according to terms
specified in the particular bond contract.21 9 Majority-action principles
should guide the approval of the restructuring agreement so that if, for
example, seventy-five percent of the holders vote in favor of the
agreement, its terms will bind all those in dissent.221 In this respect,
the proposed alternative mimics the effect of CACs. 22' This last
objective would require an entirely new addition to the Agreement:
Banking, 442 N.E.2d at 1203-04 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that IMF silence
regarding Turkey's capital Regulations could be interpreted as implied
acquiescence or approval).
217. Functioning as yet another safeguard against potential abuse, this clause
allows the IMF to affirmatively disapprove of the imposed regulation, but only
when there is objective proof that something other than a need for restructuring
motivated the Regulation's imposition. Cf Agreement, supra note 100, art. VI, § 3
(illustrating that Members have within their sole discretion the ability to impose
section 2(b) Regulations on "capital movements").
218. This clause ensures that the bondholders are not indefinitely denied their
enforcement rights. See TENNEKOON, supra note 28, at 193 (noting that the terms of
the bond contract serve as a source of rights upon which the creditor can sue the
debtor for specific performance).
219. This is an issue for the bond contract and, therefore, leaves the confines of
this Comment.
220. See A United States Perspective, supra note 71 (recounting American
support for the use of CACs and advocating the presence of a majority action
clause). Use of a majority action clause attempts to secure American support by
incorporating the essence of the American-favored collective-action clauses. Id.
Also, it achieves the IMF-stated goal to form a bankruptcy mechanism that allows a
majority of the creditors to conclude a legally binding agreement with the debtor.
See Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (recounting the IMF proposal that the
SDRM be premised on collective action principles).
221. See Hubbard, supra note 77 (explaining that the inclusion of CACs into
bond contracts must allow "for aggregate collective action and representation
against all instruments," as well as permit a supermajority of creditors to impose a
restructuring agreement on all remaining creditors).
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Consistent with Article VIII, section 2(b), if a Member imposes an
exchange regulation to address a liquidity crisis, and during the application
of that regulation the Member reaches an agreement with seventy-five
percent of its creditors, said agreement shall thereafter bind all remaining
creditors and shall enjoy extraterritorial enforcement in the courts of any
Member. 222
B. SDRM's OBJECTIVES ARE FULFILLED BY THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS
This proposed framework fulfills all the functions of an effective
international bankruptcy system.223 First, the proposed framework
provides the debtor with stay protection by imposing regulations on
debt payments that Members' courts will not have the power to
subvert. 24 Second, it provides a period of reprieve during which a
debtor and its creditors may reach a restructuring agreement. 225 Third,
the length of the stay is extendable.226 Fourth, the Member can
implement the section 2(b) Regulation so as to guard against capital
outflow, thus ensuring that skittish investors do not exacerbate the
economic malaise. 27 Fifth, and somewhat related, because there is no
prior IMF approval required, the sovereign can impose the Regulation
222. This proposed provision embodies the initiative to garner the U.S. support
by premising the proposal on majority action principals. See generally id.
(expressing the U.S. support for CACs, which are based upon majority action, in the
absence of a centralized forum).
223. See generally Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (detailing the major goals
of the IMF's SDRM).
224. See Gianviti, supra note 47, at 1375 (explaining how the effect of a
legitimately-imposed section 2(b) regulation is tantamount to a bankruptcy stay);
see also discussion supra Part III.A (presenting possible amendments to the
Agreement that would allow a debtor to successfully use section 2(b) Regulations
as a stay mechanism).
225. See Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (explaining that the period during the
stay's application provides a convenient opportunity for effective negotiation free
from menacing creditor claims).
226. See id. (noting the SDRM's central feature as the ability of creditors to
extend the length of the bankruptcy stay).
227. See GOLD, supra note 120, at 30 (noting that the purpose of section 2(b)
Regulations was to place in the Member the ability to impose capital controls in
response to exchange rate crises). This attribute is a mere byproduct of the original
purpose of section 2(b) regulations. Id.
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immediately, thereby protecting itself from speculative attacks on its
currency by foreign investors.228 Sixth, the IMF will have the ability
to block application if it determines the Regulation to be an abuse of
the Member's discretion.229
Perhaps most importantly, such proposed changes to the
Agreement are likely to win a favorable vote from the United
States.23° Unlike the SDRM, the proposed alternative does not
contemplate the formation of a centralized forum.23" ' The United
States has repeatedly expressed its contempt for establishing such an
independent entity.232 Furthermore, the process through which a
restructuring agreement would be approved bears a striking
resemblance to that of CACs,233 which, unlike the SDRM, have
garnered American support.234 Lastly, this system does not require a
permanent divestment of jurisdiction from Members' courts, because
if the parties fail to reach an agreement, or if the IMF determines the
Regulation to be an abuse of discretion, the creditors are once again
free to bring private actions.235
228. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing the mechanics of
investor speculation and its negative economic effects).
229. See Gianviti, supra note 47, at 1375-77 (noting that section 2(b) can be
employed to give Members the unilateral capacity to stay all creditor claims). This
attribute of the proposed framework is intended to curtail potential abuse of section
2(b) Regulations. Id.
230. See A United States Perspective, supra note 71 (expressing the United
States' support for CACs' majority action principals of CACs).
231. See Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (emphasizing issues associated with
the creation of an independent forum).
232. See Hubbard, supra note 77 (expressing American reluctance towards the
creation of an independent bankruptcy forum).
233. See Buchheit, supra note 9, at 228 (positing that CACs would allow a
supermajority of bondholders to agree to amendments on the payment terms of the
bond, which would then become binding on other bondholders); see also supra note
221 and accompanying text (illustrating the symmetry between CACs and this
Comment's proposed solution).
234. See A United States Perspective, supra note 71 (expressing the United
States' support for the majority action principals of CACs).
235. Cf TENNEKOON, supra note 28, at 193 (noting that the terms of the bond
contract serve as a source of rights upon which the creditor can sue the debtor).
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CONCLUSION
The IMF has admirably endeavored to institutionalize the process
of sovereign debt restructuring.23 6 Unfortunately, the United States
has given every indication that its official support for the IMF plan is
not forthcoming.2 37 Moreover, the United States enjoys the voting
capacity to turn its official objection into an insurmountable
obstacle.238 Under these circumstances, the SDRM will likely never
become a physical reality. 39 This does not mean, however, that the
IMF's groundwork should be dismissed as nalve and idealistic.240 To
the contrary, the international community must orchestrate a bold
commitment to stabilize the restructuring process.241  The
consequences of procrastination have manifested themselves many
times in the past and will most certainly continue to do so in the
future.242 In the modern interdependent economy, every state will
have a vested stake in the outcome of future debt crises. 43 Therefore,
the search for an acceptable framework must continue.
The present form of section 2(b) is, upon first glance, an appealing
alternative.244 Yet, U.S. courts have managed to cripple the
236. See Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (detailing and explaining the SDRM
proposal in depth); see also Bretton Woods Committee, supra note 79 (outlining a
proposed sovereign debt initiative).
237. See Hubbard, supra note 77 (expressing American reluctance towards the
creation of an independent bankruptcy forum).
238. See Agreement, supra note 100, art. XXVIII (codifying that Amendments
must receive the affirmative vote of eighty-five percent of the total voting power);
see also Quotas and Voting Power, supra note 103 (demonstrating that the United
States enjoys more than seventeen percent of IMF voting power).
239. See supra note 238 and accompanying text (asserting that the IMF cannot
implement the SDRM without American support).
240. See generally Hopes and Hazards, supra note 21 (detailing the IMF plan).
241. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (detailing the consequences
of unregulated debt crises).
242. See id. (examining the ramifications of inaction during a debt crisis).
243. See supra note 57 (explaining the phenomenon of contagion, whereby the
economic malaise of one country can easily spread to other countries).
244. See Gianviti, supra note 47, at 1375-77 (noting that Members have the
ability to employ section 2(b) to give themselves the unilateral capacity to stay all
creditor claims); see also discussion supra Part II.B.I (explaining in depth the
theoretical appeal of using Article VIII, section 2(b).
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provision's efficacy through narrow interpretations designed to retain
as much jurisdiction as possible.245 These courts have failed to
consider the long-term economic and legal consequences of their
decisions.246 In response, the IMF Members must resolve themselves
to amend their nearly sixty-year-old Agreement so that section 2(b)
can function as the mainstay of an international bankruptcy scheme.247
Indeed, the IMF can breathe life into the now-impotent section 2(b)
by embracing such an amendment process. 248 By winning American
support and by achieving the objectives of the SDRM, these changes
constitute the best possible compromise.249
245. See, e.g., Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional De Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F.
Supp. 870, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (restricting the use of section 2(b) Regulations).
246. See supra notes 56-57 (suggesting possible consequences of the courts'
narrow interpretation of Article VIII, section 2(b)); see also discussion supra Part
II.B.2.a-b (arguing that courts often fail to account for the international economic
and international legal consequences of their decisions).
247. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (arguing that section 2(b) cannot serve as an
effective bankruptcy mechanism unless it undergoes significant change).
248. See discussion supra Part III (arguing that the amendment process can
address section 2(b)'s present shortcomings).
249. See discussion supra Part III (arguing that this Comment's recommendation
both accomplishes the IMF's goals and addresses American reservations).
